1 Such uniform definitions give IT product vendors and customers a common and unambiguous terminology for RBAC features, which can lead to wider adoption of RBAC and increased productivity. However, the current ANSI RBAC standard has several limitations, design flaws, and technical errors that, if unaddressed, could lead to confusions among IT product vendors and customers and to RBAC implementations with different semantics, thus defeating the standard's purpose.
a Critique of the aNsi standard on role-based access Control
Vendors have widely adopted RBAC to manage user access to computer resources in various products, including database management systems. However, as this analysis shows, the standard is hindered by limitations, errors, and design flaws.
I n 2004, the American National Standards Institute approved the Role-Based Access Control standard to fulfill "a need among government and industry purchasers of information technology products for a consistent and uniform definition of role-based access control (RBAC) features."
1 Such uniform definitions give IT product vendors and customers a common and unambiguous terminology for RBAC features, which can lead to wider adoption of RBAC and increased productivity. However, the current ANSI RBAC standard has several limitations, design flaws, and technical errors that, if unaddressed, could lead to confusions among IT product vendors and customers and to RBAC implementations with different semantics, thus defeating the standard's purpose.
Researchers have identified some limitations in a draft version of the standard.
2 To our knowledge, however, there's no existing critique of the official standard. Our own analysis of it started in 2005, after we found significant technical errors while reading the standard for our research. Here, we identify critical design problems in the current ANSI RBAC standard and suggest solutions. We also analyze several critical RBAC features, such as sessions, hierarchies, and constraints, and discuss how RBAC models should support them. Our goal is to contribute to improvements in the RBAC standard and, more broadly, to enhance understanding of RBAC and thus contribute to future research and development.
Problem overview
In the past decade, RBAC research has exploded. In addition to the hundreds of papers on RBAC-related topics, industry's interest in it has increased dramatically, and most major IT vendors offer products incorporating RBAC in some form. Today, all major database management system (DBMS) products support RBAC, which has also been used in enterprise security management (ESM) systems such as IBM Tivoli Identity Manager (www. ibm.com/software/tivoli/products/identity-mgr) and SAM Jupiter (http://ww2.betasystems.com/en/ products/idm/products/sam_jupiter.html).
Given its relevance in products and applications for managing enterprise security, RBAC has been the focus of intense standardization activities.
both general problems and technical errors. (We point out only a few of the latter in this article; a more complete errors list is available elsewhere.
5 ) RBAC's demonstrated importance in research, product developments, and enterprise management dictates that it have solid and stable foundations. The intense past and current standardization efforts have achieved key results in this respect. Our goal is to further improve the standard and general understanding of RBAC. Our discussions-which challenge some established assumptions in the RBAC research community-are of interest not only to standards bodies, product developers, and enterprise system administrators but also to the research community. After all, a sound standard model can form the basis for new research to further extend RBAC and enhance technology transfer.
Overview: The ANSI RBAC standard
As the sidebar, "What is role-based access control?" describes, system administrators use the RBAC paradigm to control user access to computer resources. The standard consists of two parts: a reference model, which defines sets of basic RBAC elements and relations; and a system and administration functional specification (hereafter, functional specification), which specifies the RBAC system's operations and functions.
The models are each divided into four parts that correspond to the four RBAC components: 1, 4 core RBAC, hierarchical RBAC, static separation of duty (SSD) relations, and dynamic separation of duty (DSD) relations.
Core RBAC is required in all RBAC systems. These systems can further include any combination of role hierarchy, SSD, and DSD.
Core RBAC
In RBAC, the administrator assigns permissions to roles and assigns roles to individual users so they can obtain permissions. Core RBAC captures this basic concept. In the reference model, the core RBAC USERS, ROLES, OPS, and OBS (users, roles, operations, and objects, respectively). UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, a many-to-many mapping user-to-role assignment relation. assigned_users : (r : ROLES) → 2 USERS , the mapping of role r onto a set of users; formally, assigned_users(r) = {u ∈ USERS | (u, r) ∈ UA}. (Note: using the word "onto" rather than "into" here might wrongly imply that the assigned permissions function is a subjective function. Also, the standard notation of such a function is assigned_users: ROLES → 2 USERS .) PRMS = 2 (OPS×OBS) , the set of permissions. PA ⊆ PRMS × ROLES, a many-to-many mapping permission-to-role assignment relation. assigned_permissions(r : ROLES) → 2 PRMS , the mapping of role r onto a set of permissions; formally, assigned_permission(r) = {p ∈ PRMS | (p, r) ∈ PA}. Op(p : PRMS) → {op ⊆ OPS}, the permission-tooperation mapping, which gives the set of operations associated with permission p. Ob(p : PRMS) → {ob ⊆ OBS}, the permission-toobject mapping, which gives the set of objects associated with permission p. SESSIONS, the set of sessions. session_users(s : SESSIONS) → USERS, the mapping of session s onto the corresponding user. session_roles(s : SESSIONS) → 2 ROLES , the mapping of session s onto a set of roles; formally, session_roles(s i ) ⊆ {r ∈ ROLES | (session_users(s i ), r) ∈ UA}. avail_session_perms(s : SESSIONS) → 2 PRMS , the permissions available to a user in a session = ∪ r∈session_roles(s) assigned_permissions(r).
Hierarchical RBAC
The hierarchical RBAC component introduces two kinds of role hierarchies-general and limited-that define inheritance relations among roles to reduce administration costs. As the standard notes:
"Role hierarchies define an inheritance relation among roles. Inheritance has been described in terms of permissions; i.e., r 1 inherits r 2 if all privileges of r 2 are also privileges of r 1 … ."
This incorrectly suggests that the role hierarchy is induced from the subset relation among the permissions assigned to these roles. The statement implies that, if r 1 and r 2 are independently assigned the same permissions, then r 1 inherits r 2 and r 2 inherits r 1 simultaneously, which is forbidden. The statement also implies that the role hierarchy might change if you change the permission-to-role assignment relation, which is undesirable. 
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The standard describes the general role hierarchies as follows:
RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES is a partial order on ROLES (called the inheritance relation), written as ≥, where r 1 ≥ r 2 only if all permissions of r 2 are also permissions of r 1 , and all users of r 1 are also users of r 2 -that is, r 1 ≥ r 2 ⇒ authorized_permissions(r 2 ) ⊆ authorized_permissions(r 1 ). authorized_users(r : ROLES) → 2 USERS , the mapping of role r onto a set of users in the presence of a role hierarchy; formally, authorize_users(r) = {u ∈ US-ERS | r′ ≥ r, (u, r′) ∈ UA}. authorized_permissions(r : ROLES) → 2 PRMS , the mapping of role r onto a set of permissions in the presence of a role hierarchy; formally, authorized_
(Note: r′ ≥ r should actually be r ≥ r′.)
The standard's description represents node r 1 as an immediate descendant of r 2 by r 2 >> r 1 . The standard defines r 1 >> r 2 when "there exists no role r 3 in the role hierarchy such that r 1 ≥ r 3 ≥ r 2 , where r 1 ≠ r 2 and r 2 ≠ r 3 ." This definition is incorrect. The condition r 1 ≠ r 2 should actually be r 1 ≠ r 3 .
The standard describes limited role hierarchies as general role hierarchies with the following limitation: ∀r, r 1 , r 2 ∈ ROLES, (r ≥ r 1 ∧ r ≥ r 2 ) ⇒ (r 1 = r 2 ). However, this definition is incorrect as it effectively limits the maximum height of role hierarchies to two. That is, if r ≥ r 1 ≥ r 2 , then the condition requires that r 1 = r 2 . To correctly define the limitation, (r ≥ r 1 ∧ r ≥ r 2 ) should be (r >> r 1 ∧ r >> r 2 ).
A limited role hierarchy forms a forest of inverted trees. In other words, there are several junior-most roles, and any other role immediately dominates exactly one other role. Inverted trees facilitate sharing of resources (that is, permissions).
3 In this hierarchy, resources available to a junior-most role are also available to roles that are more senior. However, an inverted tree doesn't allow permission aggregation from more than one role.
Constrained RBAC
The constrained RBAC component has two types of constraints: SSD and DSD. An SSD constraint is specified by a role set, rs, such that |rs| ≥ 2, and a cardinality, n, such that 2 ≤ n ≤ |rs|. That is, no user can be authorized for n or more roles in rs. Like SSD, a DSD constraint is specified by a role set, rs, such that |rs| ≥ 2, and a cardinality, n, such that 2 ≤ n ≤ |rs|. That is, no user can simultaneously activate n or more roles from rs in one session. The difference between SSD and DSD is that, whereas SSD constraint limits the roles a user can be authorized for, a DSD constraint
limits the roles that a user can activate in one session. As the standard states:
Issues in the ANSI RBAC standard
As we now describe, we have five suggestions for improving the current RBAC standard, in addition to fixing the typos and technical errors, some of which are identified in the previous section.
Remove sessions from core RBAC
We should remove the notion of sessions from core RBAC and introduce it in a separate component. Core RBAC includes the sessions notion, defining a session as "a mapping between a user and an activated subset of roles that are assigned to the user."
1 In RBAC, it is important for achieving least-privilege-that is, every system program and user should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. However, there are important RBAC systems that don't need sessions, and the standard should accommodate these systems. We therefore suggest that sessions be included in a new, optional component rather than core RBAC.
Although sessions are useful in applications such as DBMSs, they don't apply to some other applications. For example, in ESM systems such as SAM Jupiter and Tivoli Identity Manager. RBAC provides central authorization management over many heterogeneous systems, including operating systems, applications, and databases. In such ESM systems, users are assigned memberships in roles and gain permissions on abstract representations of the systems' physical resources. ESM systems can then change the systems' policy settings-creating new accounts, changing group account memberships, changing access control lists, and so on-to provide users with system authorizations. Users interact directly with the target systems to access resources; the ESM products use RBAC only to manage the target systems' policy settings. The sessions notion doesn't exist in these systems, as permission use occurs in the target systems, not the ESM systems.
As the RBAC standard mandates:
"Not all RBAC features are appropriate for all applications. As such, this standard provides a method of packaging features through the selection of functional components and feature options within a component, beginning with a core set of RBAC features that must be included in all packages."
According to this statement, ESM products don't conform to RBAC. This is clearly undesirable, as these ESM products are generally considered to be among the most important RBAC applications. Using such ESM products to greatly reduce administrative cost has been regarded as one of RBAC's strongest justifications, and these products often drive RBAC research.
Including the sessions notion in core RBAC makes it a mandatory feature, and thereby unnecessarily restricts RBAC. RBAC's basic concept-permissions are assigned to roles, and users are assigned to roles to obtain their permissions-provides powerful and useful access control systems, regardless of session features. The sessions notion is obviously useful, but moving it from core RBAC to an optional feature would make the standard more flexible and inclusive.
Accommodate single-role sessions
The standard should accommodate RBAC systems that allow only one activated role per session. Given the standard's definition of sessions, an RBAC system that supports the sessions feature must permit multiple active roles in one session. However, some RBAC systems, such as security-enhanced Linux (www.nsa. gov/selinux) and those in some database systems, can activate only one role per session. Let's consider the following two approaches:
In single-role activation (SRA), a system can activate only one role per session. In multi-role activation (MRA), a system can activate multiple roles per session and use DSD constraints to restrict concurrent activation of some roles.
Although the standard explicitly precludes SRA, it's sometimes the more desirable approach. For example, SRA makes it easier to enforce the least-privilege principle 6 for two reasons. First, with MRA, administrators need an additional mechanism (DSD) to enforce the least-privilege principle. A user might, for example, be assigned both the quality-assurance and developer roles, but the least-privilege principle might mandate that the roles' permissions not all be available in a single session. The SRA design automatically ensures that only one of these roles can be activated in any session. To achieve this in MRA, developers have to use DSD constraints. According to the economy of mechanism principle, 6 SRA is a better design than a • • combination of MRA and DSD. Second, to enforce the least-privilege principle, developers must review the permission sets that they can use in any session. With SRA, developers need only examine the permissions assigned to each role; they don't need to consider how users are assigned to roles. With MRA, however, developers must consider all possible role combinations that can be activated together. The number of such combinations is likely much larger than the number of roles. Furthermore, enumerating all such combinations is more difficult, as the developer must consider DSD constraints and the current user-to-role assignment.
SRA also has a less obvious, but equally important advantage over MRA. With SRA, if developers want to grant a user several roles' permissions in a single session, they must define a new role that dominates all of these roles and assign the user to it. In MRA, assigning a user to a role implicitly enables the user to activate this role along with all other roles the user already has. If some of these combinations are undesirable, the developer must explicitly specify DSD constraints to forbid them. Thus, with SRA, developers must do extra work to enable more accesses (by creating new roles), whereas with MRA, they must do extra work to forbid undesirable access (by adding constraints). As such, unlike MRA, SRA is consistent with the fail-safe defaults principle, which suggests basing "access decisions on permission rather than exclusion." 6 Finally, with SRA, developers can end up with roles that have many permissions. If they use MRA, they can end up with users who are members of many roles and who effectively have all the permissions authorized for any role in the SRA case. In SRA, permissions aggregation is explicit: if one role has too much power, it's quite obvious. MRA also has permissions aggregation, but it's more stealthy and harder to detect.
Therefore, the RBAC standard should accommodate SRA so that we can consider systems that implement SRA rather than MRA as having implemented RBAC with sessions. The standard includes limited role hierarchies to accommodate systems that support only those role hierarchies; it should do the same for SRA. In fact, in any RBAC implementation that uses sessions, developers should carefully evaluate the SRA-MRA trade-off before choosing which one to adopt.
Clearly distinguish base and derived relations
The standard doesn't clearly distinguish between base relations and derived relations. For example, the core RBAC specification includes both UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES and assigned_users : (r : ROLES) → 2 USERS . Furthermore, in the functional specification, invok-ing an administrative function (such as AssignUser, DeassignUser, or DeleteUser) updates both UA and assigned_users. This indicates that UA and assigned_ users are maintained independently. Because UA and assigned_users can be derived from each other, having to explicitly maintain both relations unnecessarily complicates the administrative function specification and makes inconsistencies possible.
We suggest that the standard should treat either UA or assigned_users as a base relation that administrative functions can update. The other one could then be included as a derived, auxiliary function for the convenience of specifying other RBAC components. The standard should explicitly make the distinction between base and derived relations.
Other, similar functions in core RBAC include assigned_permissions, which is derived from PA, the permission-assignment relation. The core RBAC relations and functions that deal with sessions include avail_session_perms, which is derived from session_roles and PA.
Maintain role-dominance relationships
The standard's reference model should maintain a relation that contains explicitly added role-dominance relationships and update this relation when the role hierarchy changes.
In the standard's hierarchical component, a partialorder relation, RH, maintains and receives updates for the role hierarchy. Treating RH as a partial order has been the de facto approach in RBAC literature-including in the highly influential RBAC96 models. 7 Nonetheless, doing so is inappropriate when we consider role hierarchy updates. RH should include only those role-dominance relationships that administrators explicitly add (RH must be irreflexive and acyclic). Further, administrators should make changes to the role hierarchy through changes to RH. Given this, we define the actual role hierarchy, ≥, as the partial order entailed by RH-that is, RH's reflexive and transitive closure. For example, if we add the three role-dominance relationships (r 1 , r 2 ), (r 1 , r 3 ), and (r 2 , r 3 ) in that order, the RBAC system should be able to distinguish this state from the state that resulted from adding the two role-dominance relationships (r 1 , r 2 ) and (r 2 , r 3 ), even though both result in the same partial order for the role hierarchy.
In the standard, the role hierarchy is modeled using a partial-order relation, ≥, and an immediate predecessor relation, >>, is defined as: r 1 >> r 2 if r 1 ≥ r 2 and there's no other role r 3 such that r 1 ≥ r 3 ≥ r 2 . Two functions-AddInheritance and DeleteInheritance-are defined such that only an inheritance relationship not in ≥ can be added, only an inheritance relationship in >> can be removed, and the role hierarchy that resulted from removing such an inheritance relationship (r 1 , r 2 ) is the reflexive and transitive closure of >> with (r 1 , r 2 ) removed.
Consider the RBAC state in va, which includes the following role-dominance relationships: PM ≥ Eng and PM ≥ QA. Suppose that when a company is about to release a product, the project manager wants engineers to also serve as QAs and adds a temporary relationship, Eng ≥ QA. This change results in the role hierarchy in Figure 1b . Following the release, the project manager wants to delete the temporary relationship, and expects the hierarchy to return to the original state (Figure 1a) . However, the standard's DeleteInheritance also deletes the relationship PM ≥ QA because, after inserting relation Eng ≥ QA, the >> relation becomes {(PM, Eng), (Eng, QA)}. Thus, removing relation Eng ≥ QA results in the role hierarchy in Figure 1c . Also, in Figure 1b 's role hierarchy, it's impossible to remove the inheritance relation (PM, QA) using DeleteInheritance-even though it was explicitly added-because (PM, QA) is not in the immediate predecessor relation.
Some researchers have suggested that we should keep all other role-dominance relationships while removing one (as in a proposed RBAC administrative model 8 ). That is, the system would retain PM ≥ QA after deleting Eng ≥ QA. However, this introduces other problems. Consider the RBAC state in Figure  1d , which contains the Arc ≥ Eng relationship. After adding Eng ≥ QA, the state changes to Figure 1e . After removing Eng ≥ QA, we'd expect to return to the original state (Figure 1d ). After all, the only reason that the Arc role dominates the QA role in Figure 1e is because of the existence of Eng ≥ QA. However, the state changes to Figure 1f , rather than to Figure 1d . In fact, the standard acknowledges both options, and addresses them as follows. When DeleteInheritance is invoked with two given roles, say Role A and Role B, the system must do one of two things:
Preserve the implicit inheritance relationships that roles A and B have with other roles in the hierarchy. That is, if role A inherits other roles, say C and D, through role B, role A will maintain permissions for C and D after the relationship with role B is deleted. Break all inherited relationships once the relationship between Role A and Role B is deleted.
The specification leaves the question of DeleteInheritance semantics as an implementation issue, and offers no prescriptions. However, the option to select either of the two is inconsistent with the standard's DeleteIn-
•
• heritance definition, which adopts the second option. Furthermore, as we discussed earlier, neither option is satisfactory. If neither option is "more correct" than the other, we shouldn't be forced to choose between them. The problem is that if we maintain only a partial order, we can't distinguish explicitly added roledominance relationships from those that are implied. For example, two different sets of role-dominance relationships might entail exactly the same partial order. From the partial order, we can't tell which is the intended set. Maintaining only the derived partial order means that we don't have complete information about the current RBAC state and problems arise when we change the role-dominance relationships.
To solve this, what we propose is to maintain explicitly added role-dominance relationships in RH and use RH to derive the implied partial order ≥. For performance considerations, an RBAC system could choose to cache ≥, as long as it could tell which dominance relationship was explicitly added and which was derived.
This issue isn't a minor implementation detail. 
Related work
Database security research first introduced the notion of roles to access control as a means to group permissions and thus ease security administration. 1,2 David Ferraiolo and Richard Kuhn coined the term "Role-Based Access Control" in 1992.
3 Ravi Sandhu and colleagues developed the influential RBAC96 family of RBAC models 4 and explained their rationale, including why they considered sessions a fundamental concept.
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From these early RBAC works, efforts emerged to create the NIST RBAC standard. The first proposal appeared at the 2000 ACM Workshop on RBAC 6 and organized the standard into four levels of increasing capabilities.
Flat RBAC requires the essential elements that capture the basic RBAC concept, including user, object, role, and so on.
Hierarchical RBAC requires role-hierarchy support.
Constrained RBAC requires enforcing separation of duties (SoD), which includes static SOD (based on user-role assignment) and dynamic SOD (based on role activation).
Symmetric RBAC requires permission-role review. question is how the system should maintain a role hierarchy. When an RBAC paper mentions a role hierarchy, it almost always treats it as a partial order. This might reflect the influence of earlier work on mandatory access control (MAC), 10 in which security levels are organized as a lattice (a partial order). Lattices, however, have a fixed security level; as we noted earlier, role hierarchies are dynamic and thus require a different approach.
Clearly specify role-inheritance semantics
The standard should clearly specify and discuss the semantics of role inheritance. RBAC implicitly allows three possible interpretations for a role hierarchy. In Figure 2 , for example, r 1 ≥ r 2 might mean one or more of the following:
User inheritance (UI): All users who are authorized for the role r 1 are also authorized for r 2 . Under this interpretation, the user, u, is authorized for r 2 and is therefore authorized for the permission p 2 , but r 1 is not authorized for p 2 . Permission inheritance (PI): The role r 1 is automatically authorized for all permissions for which r 2 is • • authorized; u is authorized for r 1 but not for r 2 . However, because r 1 is authorized for p 2, u is authorized for p 2 . Activation inheritance (AI): When r 1 activates in a session, r 2 also activates, but u cannot activate r 2 directly (because u is not authorized for r 2 without UI). However, u can activate r 1 , indirectly causing r 2 to activate. In other words, u cannot use p 2 in a session without activating r 1 .
The standard mentions or alludes to all three kinds of inheritance semantics. However, it doesn't clearly specify and discuss their relationships and interactions with other features. It's also sometimes inconsistent about which semantics an RBAC system should use. We conducted a detailed analysis of the interactions among the three interpretations and other RBAC features, including SRA, MRA, SSD, and DSD. The numbered items in the following list correspond with Table 1 , which summarizes our analysis: This appears to be a correct decision, as RBAC administration remains an active research area and the community has yet to reach a consensus.
Sandhu discussed role-hierarchies' permission-usage aspect (which corresponds to our PI interpretation) and role-activation aspect (which corresponds to UI), suggested using two hierarchies-one for each aspect. When using sessions, UI makes it easier to achieve the least-privilege principle than using PI and AI, as a user can activate a less powerful role if it's sufficient for the current task. If there are SSD constraints and administrators use just PI and not UI, users can circumvent the SSD constraints' intention. For example, if two roles, r 1 and r 2 , are declared mutually exclusive, the intention is that no user should be authorized for the roles' combined permissions. However, with just PI alone, if an administrator mistakenly defines a role, r 3 , to dominate both r 1 and r 2 and assign a user u to r 3 , then u has permissions of both r 1 and r 2 without violating the constraint, as u isn't authorized for r 1 or r 2 without UI. Thus, the absence of UI results in less strict SSD constraints, which apply to users directly assigned to the conflicting roles, but not to users assigned to their senior roles.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
DSD constraints make sense only for MRA sessions. Similar to the SSD situation, with DSD constraints, having PI but not AI lessens the constraints' strictness. For example, suppose that r 1 ≥ r2 and r 3 ≥ r 4 , and that r 2 and r 4 are declared dynamically mutually exclusive. With PI but not AI, a user can exercise the combined permissions from both r 2 and r 4 without violating the constraint, as the user can use the permissions of r 2 and r 4 without activating them. Therefore, the absence of AI leads to less strict DSD constraints, which are enforced only for users directly assigned to the conflicting roles.
As our summary in Table 1 shows, the standard is unclear as to which of the three interpretations developers should use. In Section A.2.2, the standard states: "When that given role is activated by a user, the question of whether the inherited roles are automatically activated or must be explicitly activated by a user is left as an implementation issue and no one course of action is prescribed as part of this specification." However, given the definition of functions such as AddActiveRole, we can infer that the standard's functional specification adopts the approach of UI, and PI, but not AI. The AddActiveRole function adds only the role explicitly specified to the session_roles relation, and the check for DSD constraints checks only the roles in session_roles. As discussed earlier, this means that users can circumvent the DSD constraints' effect, which might be undesirable. Our suggestion is that the standard specify and discuss the three interpretations for role hierarchies, make recommendations about which interpretations developers should use, and define the functional specification in a way that's consistent with the recommendations. As our analysis implies, one 7. 
